**Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) Protocol**

**Idea behind Group Keys**
In an organization, there may be several groups of people that should be privy to certain information, and these groups could be bigger than 2 people. Up until now, we have discussed two individuals communicating with either a shared secret key that no one else knows, but never entertained the idea of several people (more than 2) having a single shared secret key. Furthermore, organizations may have several groups with different levels of access/security. Thus, instead of just having one secret key shared with one other individual, it makes sense for there to be several secret keys, one for each group an individual belongs to.

With this added functionality comes added flexibility:

1) How do we add someone to an existing group?

2) What happens if someone has to leave a group? (Namely: we wouldn't want that person to continue to be able to read the group communications.)

3) As these changes may update quite a few people, is there an efficient way so that we don't have to update too many keys whenever some change occurs to a group?

**General Idea Behind a Group Diffie-Hellman Key**
If there are three users, Alisha, Bennie and Calista with private keys $a$, $b$, and $c$, then $g^{abc} \mod p$ can be their shared key. (Notice that it would still be okay in this situation if the shared key between Alisha and Bennie was $g^{ab} \mod p$, the shared key between Alisha and Calista was $g^{ac} \mod p$, and the shared key between Bennie and Calista was $g^{bc} \mod p$.

**Use of a Binary Tree to implement Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman**
Imagine that the structure of the groups could be organized in a binary tree. All end users would be leaf nodes and the shared secret keys between groups would be stored in internal nodes. This idea is best understood with a diagram. The whole system uses a single public key prime, $p$ and generator, $g$. Each user (leaf node) has its own secret key, $a_i$. Each internal node, $j$, has two different keys associated with it: $K_j$, which represents the shared secret key between all users in the subtree of node $j$, and $BK_j$, which represents the "blind key" for that node which will then get used to generate group keys for ancestor nodes. Let's look at a small picture of a system with four users:

$$(K_0, BK_0)$$

$$(K_1, BK_1) \quad (K_2, BK_2)$$

$$(K_3, BK_3) \quad (K_4, BK_4)$$

$$(K_5, BK_5)$$
Let's see how each key and blind key gets calculated:

\[
K_1 = g^{a_1a_2} \pmod{p} \rightarrow BK_1 = g^{K_1} \pmod{p}
\]

\[
K_2 = g^{a_3a_4} \pmod{p} \rightarrow BK_2 = g^{K_2} \pmod{p}
\]

\[
K_0 = g^{K_1K_2} \pmod{p} \rightarrow BK_0 = g^{K_0} \pmod{p}, \text{ notice that since this is the root node, BK}_0 \text{ technically never gets used.}
\]

Thus, \(K_1\) is the shared key for users with secret keys \(a_1\) and \(a_2\).

\(K_2\) is the shared key for users with secret keys \(a_3\) and \(a_4\).

\(K_0\) is the shared key for all four users.

Note: We use the blind key as the piece of information that is publicly sent to the sibling node so that the new key for the parent node can be calculated.

**Adding a New User**

The system does not have to always be a perfect binary tree. Let's consider adding a new user with secret key \(a_5\). Here is how the tree structure could change in this case:

```
(\text{K}_0, \text{BK}_0)
  /           \           /
(K_1, \text{BK}_1)  (K_2, \text{BK}_2)  \            /
/ \          /           /           /  \           /
 a_1 a_2 (K_3, \text{BK}_3) a_4  \          na_3 a_5
```

In this case, we just have to recalculate all keys up the ancestral path. The user with which we are splitting the new user will have to choose a new secret key, which is designated as \(na_3\). Here are the new calculations:

\[
K_3 = g^{na_3a_5} \pmod{p} \rightarrow BK_3 = g^{K_3} \pmod{p}
\]

\[
K_2 = g^{K_3a_4} \pmod{p} \rightarrow BK_2 = g^{K_2} \pmod{p}
\]

\[
K_0 = g^{K_1K_2} \pmod{p} \rightarrow BK_0 = g^{K_0} \pmod{p}
\]

Basically, the new user affects every ancestor key, thus, we just have to update, in order, from bottom to top of the tree, each ancestor's key and blind key, going up the tree. In practice, this is likely done via recursion and as the function calls pop off the stack, the new keys are calculated in this order. For large trees, if there are \(n\) users, the number of updates, so long as we keep the tree reasonably balanced will be \(O(\log n)\), since the average height of a randomly composed binary tree of \(n\) elements is \(O(\log n)\).
Deleting a User
Deleting is similar to insertion. When a member is deleted, then changes must be made up the ancestral path. Since each user is always a leaf node, the cases for delete are not as complicated as deletion from a regular binary search tree. Let's consider an example:

```
(K₀, BK₀)  \\
|     |     |
(K₁, BK₁)   (K₂, BK₂)  \\
|     |     |     |
(K₃, BK₃)   (K₄, BK₄)   (K₅, BK₅)   (K₆, BK₆)  \\
|     |     |     |     |     |     |
(K₇, BK₇)   a₃     a₄     a₅     a₆     a₇     a₈     a₉  \\
|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
a₁     a₂
```

Let's say the user with secret key a₇ leaves the group. This means that the node with K₅ will disappear and be replaced by a₆. But, because the groups have changed, we require that the user with secret key a₆ change it to na₆. Here is the new picture and the ensuing key changes:

```
(K₀, BK₀)  \\
|     |     |
(K₁, BK₁)   (K₂, BK₂)  \\
|     |     |     |
(K₃, BK₃)   (K₄, BK₄)   na₆   (K₆, BK₆)  \\
|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
(K₇, BK₇)   a₃     a₄     a₅     a₆     a₇     a₈     a₉  \\
|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
a₁     a₂
```

\[ K₂ = g^{K₆na₆} \pmod{p} \rightarrow BK₂ = g^{K₂} \pmod{p} \]
\[ K₀ = g^{K₁K₂} \pmod{p} \rightarrow BK₀ = g^{K₀} \pmod{p} \]
Small Example with Numbers
For simplicity, let's use $p = 29$, and $g = 2$. Let's use the picture from our previous example:

\[
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
(K_0, BK_0) & \leftarrow & (K_1, BK_1) & \leftarrow & (K_2, BK_2) & \leftarrow & (K_3, BK_3) \\
& / & \leftarrow & (K_4, BK_4) & \leftarrow & (K_5, BK_5) & \leftarrow (K_6, BK_6) \\
& / & \leftarrow & / & \leftarrow & / & \leftarrow / \\
& / & \leftarrow & / & \leftarrow & / & \leftarrow / \\
(K_7, BK_7) & \leftarrow & a_3 & \leftarrow & a_4 & \leftarrow & a_5 & \leftarrow & a_6 & \leftarrow & a_7 & \leftarrow & a_8 & \leftarrow & a_9 \\
& \leftarrow & a_1 & \leftarrow & a_2
\end{array}
\]

Let's pick the following secret keys for each user:

\[a_1 = 23, a_2 = 11, a_3 = 17, a_4 = 9, a_5 = 16, a_6 = 18, a_7 = 24, a_8 = 5, a_9 = 9\]

Here are the calculations for each of the keys and blind keys:

\[K_7 = 2^{23(11)} \pmod{29} = 2\] (note that 253 is equivalent to 1 mod 28…)
\[BK_7 = 2^{a_3} \pmod{29} = 4\]
\[K_4 = 2^{9(16)} \pmod{29} = 16\]
\[BK_4 = 2^{a_4} \pmod{29} = 25\]
\[K_5 = 2^{18(24)} \pmod{29} = 7\]
\[BK_5 = 2^{a_5} \pmod{29} = 25\]
\[K_6 = 2^{5(9)} \pmod{29} = 21\]
\[BK_5 = 2^{a_6} \pmod{29} = 17\]
\[K_3 = (BK_7)^{a_3} \pmod{29} = 4^{17} \pmod{29} = 6\]
\[= g^{(K_7 a_3)} \pmod{29} = 2^{2^{17}} \pmod{29} = 6\] (showing that we can calculate this 2 ways by hand.
\[BK_3 = 2^{a_7} \pmod{29} = 12\] (note this is a coincidence)
\[K_2 = (BK_5)^{K_6} \pmod{29} = 12^{21} \pmod{29} = 12\]
\[= g^{K_5 K_6} \pmod{29} = 2^{7(21)} \pmod{29} = 12\]
\[BK_2 = 2^{a_8} \pmod{29} = 7\]
\[K_1 = (BK_3)^{K_4} \pmod{29} = 6^{16} \pmod{29} = 7\]
\[= g^{K_3 K_4} \pmod{29} = 2^{6^{16}} \pmod{29} = 7\]
\[BK_1 = 2^{a_9} \pmod{29} = 12\]
\[K_0 = (BK_1)^{K_2} \pmod{p = 12^{12} \pmod{29} = 1}\]

As you can see with small numbers, lots of coincidences can happen, but hopefully this explains the process clearly.