Incremental Analysis of Interference Among Aspects

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The Technion

Motivation

• Multiple aspects are often woven into the same system

=> Unintended interactions among the aspects may occur, even if each aspect is "correct" when woven alone


• Libraries of reusable aspects (example: a library implementing the ACID properties for transactional objects)

=> Usage guidelines for the participating aspects are needed


New Interference Type

Previously defined interference types: Interference caused by -

- Common join-points
- Updating shared variables
- Changing join-points ⇒Not enough! ∘



⇒More general definition is needed!
Interference caused by the semantics of the aspects!




Semantic Interference Among Aspects

pairwise definition; will be generalized to N aspects...

One aspect "causes" another to not give the desired result (violate its guarantee):

- Aspect A satisfies its specification $(\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{A}}, \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}})$
- Aspect B satisfies its specification $(\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{B}}, \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{B}})$
- Base system satisfies both P_A and P_B




Interference Example

General description:

- Two aspects part of a security-aspects library, to be used in password-protected systems
- Aspect E encrypts passwords Whenever a password is sent from the login screen of the system, it is encrypted (there is also a decryption part, but we ignore it here)
- Aspect F for retrieving forgotten passwords Adds a button to report that the password is forgotten. When the button is pressed, security questions are asked. If the answers are correct, the password is sent to the user.

Example Usage: Internet Access to Bank Accounts

Underlying system:



Adding Password Encryption


Aspect E, responsible for encryption.

- **E's pointcut:** a password is sent from login screen
- **E's assumption, P_E:** password-containing messages are sent only from login screen
- **E's guarantee, R_E:** each time a password is sent, it is encrypted

Later addition: aspect F

Aspect F, retrieving forgotten passwords:

- **F's pointcut:** "forgot_password" button is pressed
- **F's assumption, P**_F: *true* (no assumption needed)
- **F's guarantee,** R_F : each time a password is forgotten, it's e-mailed to the user, provided the security questions are answered



Cause of the problem

- Common join-points? No.
- Updating shared variables? No.
- Changing join-points? Not as written.
- The semantics of E and F? **Yes!**
- The presence of F (resulting in e-mailed passwords)
 violates the guarantee of E (all passwords encrypted)
 → F cannot be woven after E.
- 2. The presence of F (e-mailed passwords) violates the assumption of E (passwords sent from Login Screen only) → E cannot be woven after F

Semantic Interference – more formally

- A aspect, specified by (P_A, R_A) We assume both aspects are correct B – aspect, specified by (P_B, R_B)
- **Definition:** A does not interfere with B if for every system S,

$$(S \models P_A \land P_B) \rightarrow ((S + A) + B \models R_A \land R_B) \quad (*)$$
both assumptions
hold
$$(*) \text{ Notation: OK}_{AB}$$


Non-Interference in a Library

- Generalization of the definition to a library of N aspects:
- The aspect library is interference free if for every subset of the aspects, when they are woven into a system that satisfies all their assumptions, the resulting system satisfies all the guarantees
- We detect interference or prove interference-freedom using model-checking, where advice is modeled as state-transition system

Proving Non-Interference

- Need to prove: $\mathrm{OK}_{\mathrm{AB}}$ and $\mathrm{OK}_{\mathrm{BA}}$
- Intuitive method: Direct proof.
- For every system S satisfying $P_A \wedge P_B$, show that ((S+A)+B) and ((S+B)+A) satisfy $R_A \wedge R_B$
- But: What about N aspects in a library?
- Pairwise checks are not enough!
 Need to prove for every subset of aspects separately! (for all the subsets of 2,3,...N aspects)

Incremental Non-Interference Proof




The Incremental Method Generalizes to N

- If N aspects pairwise satisfy KP and KR in both directions, for any combination of $m \le N$ aspects from that set, there is no semantic interference.
- Each one preserves the assumption and guarantee of all the others, so no matter how many are applied, all guarantees will hold if all assumptions held in the base
- The above generalization does NOT hold for the Direct method.

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soon



Non-generalization of Direct: Example

- Aspect A: Encrypts "secret" data sent in the system – In the bank system, encrypts passwords sent from login screen
- Aspect B: Adds a possibility to "remember" the password of the user
 - Adds a private variable "password" to the User class, and stores the password there if needed.
- Aspect C: "Publishes" data of specified non-secret objects [objects with no "secret" fields] sends all the object data (including private fields) upon request.

– In the bank system – sends user data.

Aspect Specifications:

• Aspect A:

- Assumes the password are the only type of secret data, and the passwords are sent only from the login screen
- Guarantees all the secret data is sent encrypted

• Aspect B:

- Assumes nothing (adds the "save_password" button itself)
- Guarantees the password is stored in the user data if it was requested

• Aspect C:

- Assumes user objects store no secret data
- Guarantees all stored user data is sent

Interference?

• Incremental method:

- Verification of KP_{BC} fails
- Interference among the aspects is detected by pairwise checks alone

• Direct method:

- All pairwise interference checks/ succeed!
- But: the aspects do interfere when all three are applied! Aspect C violates the guarantee of A, by sending passwords unencrypted after B saves them.



How??? – C's assumption is only checked for the original base system, not for the system with B woven

B violates C's

assumption:

password might be

"secret"

Feasibility of Composition

- A aspect, specified by (P_A, R_A)
- **B** aspect, specified by $(\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{B}}, \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{B}})$

≡ noncontradicting specifications

- **Definition:** composition of **A before B** is **feasible** iff all the following formulas are satisfiable:
 - $P_A \wedge P_B$ (the assumptions are not contradictory)
 - $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}} \wedge \mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{B}}$ (the guarantee of A and the assumption of B)
 - $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}} \wedge \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{B}}$ (the guarantees are not contradictory)

Feasibility Check

- Recommended to perform in case interference was detected
- Might be performed even before the verification starts, but is not essential
- Is easier and quicker than the full verification process
- If fails the aspects can not be woven together into a system without changing their specifications (and maybe also their advice)

Automatic and Modular Interference Detection


- Both for **Direct and Incremental** method
- The MAVEN tool **extended**: improved and adopted for interference-detection purpose
- Original purpose of MAVEN: automatic modular verification of assume-guarantee aspect specifications


Strategy – MAVEN tool

- prior work
- **Build** a "generic" state machine version (T_P) of assumption P_A (called "tableau")
- Weave the aspect (A) into this model
- **Prove** that this augmented generic model (T_P+A) satisfies the desired result, R_A

representation of all the possible systems satisfying P_A

by running NuSMV model-checker





Direct Proof Method


1. Build tableau T for $P_A \wedge P_B$ **2. Use MAVEN to prove OK**_{AB}

- weave A into T, then weave B

- show $R_A \wedge R_B$ on the result

3. Use MAVEN to prove OK_{BA}

- weave B into T, then weave A
- show $R_A \wedge R_B$ on the result



Incremental method – advantages beyond generalization to N

- Easier weaving
 Quicker verification
 Cause: smaller models and TL formulas => lower complexity
- Incremental verification during library construction, 3. and not when a system is run: When adding an aspect to the library, allows checking only the new aspect vs. all the rest
- Advantage in failure analysis: 4.
 - Depending on the verification step at which we obtained the counterexample, we will know exactly which aspect caused interference and how (= which property was violated)

Error Analysis

- Who is guilty (failure localization), and what is to be done (failure treatment)?
- Failure localization:
 Which assertion was violated?
 Which aspect is responsible for the failure?
- Failure treatment:

Should the specification of any aspects be changed?

Should some advice be changed?

Failure Localization

- In Direct method problematic.
- In Incremental method straightforward:
 - Immediately follows from the verification stage that failed :
 - KP_{AB} failed => A's advice violates B's assumption.

KR_{AB} failed => B's advice violates A's guarantee

 Possible to detect and localize multiple failures (i.e., when both properties are violated)

Failure Treatment

- Feasibility check fails =>
 - Specifications have to be changed
 - Advice implementation **might** have to be changed
- Feasibility check succeeds =>
 - Advice implementation **has** to be changed
 - Specifications **might** have to be changed
- Failure elimination impossible =>
 Usage guidelines for the aspects (restrictions on the
 possible weaving order)

Bank System Example - Reminder

- S: system providing internet access to bank accounts. Involves sending passwords from "login" screen
- E: aspect in charge of encrypting the passwords sent from login screens
- F: aspect in charge of retrieving forgotten passwords; sends them by e-mail

Bank system – Verification Failures

- $\mathbf{KR}_{\mathbf{EF}}$ fails \rightarrow F can not be woven after E, because it does not preserve the guarantee of E, $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{E}}$ (the e-mailed password will be unencrypted)
- \mathbf{KP}_{FE} fails \rightarrow F can not be woven before E, because F violates the assumption of E, \mathbf{P}_E (the passwords are sent not only from the "login" screen)

Bank system – Error Analysis

- Example: KP_{FE} check failed, but
- Feasibility check succeeds
- Possible solution: Change the advice of F!
 - For example:

Change F to bring the user to a login screen and offer to enter the new password

– Result: Specifications stay the same, but OK_{FE} now holds, so we can weave F before E (but not the reverse)

Joint Weaving

- At every point of the program decides which of the aspects to apply and in which order
- When is **joint weaving** equivalent to **sequential**?

$$-(S + (A,B)) \equiv ?((S+A)+B)$$

$$-(S + (A,B)) \equiv ?((S+B)+A)$$

Joint Vs. Sequential Weaving - 1

A and B have no common join-points

=>

B does not affect the

set of A's join-points

Notation: $J_A(S)$ = set of join-points of A in S

If:


- $J_A(S) \cap J_B(S) = \emptyset$
- $J_A(S+B) = J_A(S)$

• $J_B(S+A) = J_B(S)$ A does not affect the set of B's join-points

Then:

$$(S + (A,B)) \equiv ((S+A)+B) \equiv ((S+B)+A)$$

Both orders of sequential weaving are equivalent to the joint weaving



Interference Detection in Java Systems

- Work in progress : industrial case study
 Toll System (Siemens) charging for road use
 - Formalization of aspect specifications
 - Translating advice to transition systems
 - Verification of aspects and interference detection
 Intermediate results:
 - Interference between two aspects found and is being analyzed now

Interference Detection in Java Systems(2)

• Planned: case study based on **library of reusable aspects** that implement ACID properties for transactional objects atomicity consistency isolation durability

- Large library of aspects, intended to be used as benchmark
- Authors state there is interference between the aspects
- Goal: formalization, analysis => interference warnings and non-interference proofs for the aspects => usage guidance for the library

More Work in Progress

- Generalizing the proof method
 - More weaving strategies
 - Extending MAVEN
- Refining the error analysis
- Running more complicated examples
- The formalization and proof method can be extended to treat other types of aspect interactions, such as cooperation [one aspect establishes the assumption of another...]

Summary

- Semantic interference among aspects is defined
- Anterference-detection method is modular and incremental
- Verification result is not "yes" or "no"! The method gives usage guidelines for the library
 - For any comments / questions, please write to {emika,katz}@cs.technion.ac.il

Thank you!