Y. Luo and L. Bölöni

Collaborative and competitive scenarios in spatio-temporal negotiation with agents of bounded rationality


Cite as:

Y. Luo and L. Bölöni. Collaborative and competitive scenarios in spatio-temporal negotiation with agents of bounded rationality. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Agent-basedComplex Automated Negotiations, in conjunctionwith the The Seventh Intl. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents andMulti-Agent Systems (AAMAS 08), pp. 40–47, 2008.

Download:

Download 

Abstract:

In spatio-temporal negotiation evaluating an offer for feasibility or utility often requires computationally expensive path planning, thus practical negotiation strategies can evaluate only a small subset of the possible offers during offer formation. As equilibrium strategies are not practically possible, we are interested in strategies with bounded rationality, which achieve good performance in a wide range of practical negotiation scenarios. Naturally, the performance of a strategy is dependent on the strategy of the opponent and the characteristics of the scenario. The utility of a deal alone for a particular agent is not a good measure of the quality of the negotiation strategy; we also need to consider whether better deals were overlooked or whether the agent had ``outsmarted'' the opponent, by convincing it to accept a lesser deal. We also have an intuition of collaborative scenarios (where the agents' interests are closely aligned) versus competitive scenarios (where the gain of the utility for one agent is paid off with a loss of utility for the other agent). Using the Children in the Rectangular Forest (CRF) game as a canonical model of spatio-temporal negotiation, we develop a series of quantitative metrics for the characterization of deals in relation to the possibilities of the scenario and the interest of the other agent. We also develop a metric for the collaborativeness of the scenario. Through an experimental study involving three negotiation strategies of increasing complexity, we show that the proposed metrics match our intuition about the scenarios and can serve as a tool in analyzing and developing strategies as well as in designing negotiation mechanisms promoting cooperative behavior.

BibTeX:

@inproceedings{Luo-2008-ACAN,
author = "Y. Luo and L. B{\"o}l{\"o}ni",
title = "Collaborative and competitive scenarios in spatio-temporal negotiation with agents of bounded rationality",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Agent-based
Complex Automated Negotiations, in conjunction
with the The Seventh Intl. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 08)",
year = "2008",
pages = "40-47",
abstract = {
  In spatio-temporal negotiation evaluating an offer for feasibility
  or utility often requires computationally expensive path planning,
  thus practical negotiation strategies can evaluate only a small
  subset of the possible offers during offer formation. As
  equilibrium strategies are not practically possible, we are
  interested in strategies with bounded rationality, which achieve
  good performance in a wide range of practical negotiation
  scenarios. Naturally, the performance of a strategy is dependent
  on the strategy of the opponent and the characteristics of the
  scenario. The utility of a deal alone for a particular agent is
  not a good measure of the quality of the negotiation strategy; we
  also need to consider whether better deals were overlooked or
  whether the agent had ``outsmarted'' the opponent, by convincing
  it to accept a lesser deal. We also have an intuition of
  collaborative scenarios (where the agents' interests are closely
  aligned) versus competitive scenarios (where the gain of the
  utility for one agent is paid off with a loss of utility for the
  other agent).
  Using the Children in the Rectangular Forest (CRF) game as a
  canonical model of spatio-temporal negotiation, we develop a
  series of quantitative metrics for the characterization of deals
  in relation to the possibilities of the scenario and the interest
  of the other agent. We also develop a metric for the
  collaborativeness of the scenario. Through an experimental study
  involving three negotiation strategies of increasing complexity,
  we show that the proposed metrics match our intuition about the
  scenarios and can serve as a tool in analyzing and developing
  strategies as well as in designing negotiation mechanisms
  promoting cooperative behavior.
 }
}

Generated by bib2html.pl (written by Patrick Riley, Lotzi Boloni ) on Mon Sep 16, 2019 10:57:16