

## Hash function

Input: arbitrary size (any number of bits)

Output: fixed size  $k$  bits ( $2^k$  possible

many-to-one function

output values)

good  $\checkmark$  function makes the probability of each hash

output value roughly equally likely + given a fixed output value it should be computationally infeasible to generate an input that has that hash value as output.

Analogy: One use passwords

WORST

store table w/ user names + passwords.

FIRST improvement

Store username + hash (pswd)

alice

101110...11

Weakness: One could create a "rainbow table"

1. Have a list of potential passwords
2. For each calc  $\text{hash}(\text{pswd})$ .
3. Compare outputs from #2 with my stolen list!

## IMPROVEMENT

adding "salt" to a pswd

<u>table</u>	"salt"	
<u>user</u>	<u>rndbitstring</u>	<u>hash value</u>
U1	salt <sub>1</sub>	$\text{hash}(\text{pswd}_1 \parallel \text{salt}_1)$
U2	salt <sub>2</sub>	$\text{hash}(\text{pswd}_2 \parallel \text{salt}_2)$

effect to create tables is multiplied by # of users.

# One big use is message authentication

$K = \text{key}$ ,  $M = \text{msg}$ ,  $H(m) = \text{hash value of msg}$

1. Alice sends Bob  $E(K, [M \parallel H(m)])$

Bob decrypts, gets  $M'$  and  $H(m')$ . <sup>concatenate</sup>  
He calculates  $H(M')$  <sup>makes sure it matches this</sup>

2. Alice sends Bob  $M \parallel E(K, H(m))$

Bob decrypts <sup>plaintext everyone see</sup> to get  $H(m)'$   
Makes sure  $H(m) = H(m)'$  (received)

3. Alice sends Bob  $M \parallel H(M \parallel S)$

4. Alice sends Bob  $E(K, M \parallel H(M \parallel S))$

Version 3 w/ encryption added as last step

# Verifying who sent the message

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Alice  $\rightarrow$  Bob

$$M \parallel E(PR_K, H(m))$$

To verify  
Alice sent  
message.

$\swarrow$   
Alice's  
Private key

$\swarrow$  Alice's Public  
key

Bob takes this and uses  $PU_K$  and  
uses this to decrypt and reveal  $H(m')$   
if this matches  $H(m)$ , Alice had to  
have sent it.

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If we also want the message to be  
secret we can send

$$E(K, M \parallel E(PR_K, H(m)))$$

$\uparrow$   
secret  
shared  
key  
for symmetric  
system

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$\hookrightarrow$  Another equivalent but slower idea

$$E(PU_{Bob}, E(PR_{Alice}, M))$$

Bob receives this +

1. Decrypts w/  $PR_{Bob}$ .
2. Decrypts w/  $PU_{Alice}$
3. If this is readable
  - a) Alice must have sent it
  - b) Only Bob can read it.

But this is extremely slow  
because encryption/decryption  
via Public Key Cryptography is  
much slower than Private Key +  
here large messages are fully  
being encrypted (twice) via  
Public Key systems